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Abstract
Imaging studies have revealed a putative neural account of emotional bias in decision making. However, it has been difficult
in previous studies to identify the causal role of the different sub-regions involved in decision making. The Ultimatum Game
(UG) is a game to study the punishment of norm-violating behavior. In a previous influential paper on UG it was suggested
that frontal insular cortex has a pivotal role in the rejection response. This view has not been reconciled with a vast literature
that attributes a crucial role in emotional decision making to a subcortical structure (i.e., amygdala). In this study we
propose an anatomy-informed model that may join these views. We also present a design that detects the functional
anatomical response to unfair proposals in a subcortical network that mediates rapid reactive responses. We used a
functional MRI paradigm to study the early components of decision making and challenged our paradigm with the
introduction of a pharmacological intervention to perturb the elicited behavioral and neural response. Benzodiazepine
treatment decreased the rejection rate (from 37.6% to 19.0%) concomitantly with a diminished amygdala response to unfair
proposals, and this in spite of an unchanged feeling of unfairness and unchanged insular response. In the control group,
rejection was directly linked to an increase in amygdala activity. These results allow a functional anatomical detection of the
early neural components of rejection associated with the initial reactive emotional response. Thus, the act of immediate
rejection seems to be mediated by the limbic system and is not solely driven by cortical processes, as previously suggested.
Our results also prompt an ethical discussion as we demonstrated that a commonly used drug influences core functions in
the human brain that underlie individual autonomy and economic decision making.
Citation: Gospic K, Mohlin E, Fransson P, Petrovic P, Johannesson M, et al. (2011) Limbic Justice—Amygdala Involvement in Immediate Rejection in the
Ultimatum Game. PLoS Biol 9(5): e1001054. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001054
Academic Editor: Ernst Fehr, University of Zurich, Switzerland
Received January 26, 2011; Accepted March 21, 2011; Published May 3, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Gospic et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was funded by the Swedish Research Council, The Barbro and Bernard Osher Foundation, The Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems
(VINNOVA), The Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research, The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation, The Swedish Council for Working Life and Social
Research, The Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation and the Karolinska Institute. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision
to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
Abbreviations: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; fMRI, functional MRI; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; RL, reinforcement
learning; SEK, Swedish crowns; UG, Ultimatum Game
* E-mail: katarina.gospic@ki.se
. These authors contributed equally to this work.
Introduction
Research within behavioral economics and psychology has
demonstrated that human decisions are based on more dimensions
than simply maximization of monetary reward [1–3]. One
important factor with prominent impact on decision making is
the influence of emotional processes [4]. Emotional processes
include both emotional responses [5] and feeling states [6].
Emotional responses are rapid and automatic in order to meet the
demands for fast contextual adaptation. On the other hand, the
representation of feeling states and the regulatory control of
emotions reflect a slower adjustment to long-term considerations
and goals [6]. Recently, brain imaging studies have shown that
emotional systems are active in decision making [2,7–9]. However,
it is difficult to identify the causal role of the different sub-regions
involved in decision making based on these correlational studies.
A human universal in social cooperation is the tendency to
respond with immediate aggression upon perceived threat or
unfairness [10]. Evolution seems to have favored the act of
punishing those who violate perceived norms of the group [11]. A
suitable paradigm to study the punishment of norm-violating
behavior is the Ultimatum Game (UG) [12]. In the UG, a
proposer suggests a way to divide a fixed sum of money. The
responder has to accept or reject the proposal. If the responder
accepts the proposal, the suggested split is realized. If the
responder rejects the offer, neither of the two gets anything.
Proposers often offer an even split, and unfair offers are frequently
rejected; offers of #20% are rejected roughly half of the time [3].
These findings are robust with respect to learning effects, stake
size, and other manipulations [3]. Although both individual
genetic traits and cultural variation influence the response pattern,
the general propensity to punish norm violators seems to be
universal [13,14].
While there have been previous attempts within the field to
include anatomical information in the behaviorally validated
theoretical models of decision making, a mechanistic explanation
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Existing interdisciplinary economic models are incomplete [16] in
that the biological framework is not fully defined. Several studies
have suggested that emotional theory may add important
information for choice behavior [1,2]. The evolution of the frontal
lobes in humans has extended the ability for long-term reasoning
[17]. In a pioneering paper Sanfey et al. [7] suggested that the
forebrain network (anterior insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
[dlPFC], and anterior cingulate cortex [ACC]) has a pivotal role in
the rejection response in the UG [7]. This result is at variance with
a vast literature that attributes a crucial role in emotional decision
making to a subcortical structure (i.e., the amygdala) [2,4,18].
Here we propose an anatomy-informed model that may link these
seemingly opposing views. Gla ¨scher et al. [19] proposed that
intuitive decisions could be considered as cognitively model-free
reinforcement learning (RL), whereas deliberate choices could be
viewed as model-based RL. By combining computational learning
models with functional imaging data they found that model-free
RL was associated with subcortical processing and model-based
RL was linked to cortical processing. They suggested that decision
making involves at least two neural networks that seem to have
distinct neural correlates. Thus, both cortical and subcortical levels
may influence the final behavior in either direction in the UG, and
the major difference is that the cortical level has a richer
representation of future outcomes of a decision [17,19].
In the UG, the payoff-maximizing strategy for the responder
(individual level) is to accept all offers, and reciprocally for the
proposer it is to make the smallest possible offer [12]. The UG
demands a simple and rapid yes/no answer, but the underlying
reason for a response is complex and extends beyond payoff
maximization and includes influences from social interactions. For
example, the responder needs to consider: social hierarchy, tit-for-
tat, preparing for the next encounter, maintenance of social
norms, reputation building, and avoidance of social rejection.
Short-term unaware responses are instantiated in the subcortical
emotion system (e.g., the amygdala) [4,20,21], whereas the long-
term considerations pertain to frontal cortex and insula [22,23]. In
order to reconcile the paradox in the literature on the UG [7,24]
and decision making [2,4], we hypothesized that the response in
the UG rests on a balance between phylogenetically older
structures involved in the automatic reactive emotional response
and neocortical areas associated with the neural processing of
feeling states, future representation, and regulation of emotions
[5,6,17].
Previous imaging studies [7,24] on decision making in the UG
did not specifically aim to separate instant automatic responses
from slower affective processes associated with awareness [6]. The
immediate responses are likely to be transient and mitigated when
emotional regulation sets in [25]. Thus, a prerequisite to detect
these responses is to have a strictly defined onset time for when
unfairness may be detected. Fast automatic responses in the UG
have not previously been captured since the proposals were
presented for 6 s [7,24], thereby not providing a clear definition of
the onset time for possible detection of unfairness. Thus, in the
previous studies, there is a possibility that the experimental design
precluded a detection of early and transient responses. In our
experiment, the proposals were given orally in movie clips, and we
formulated the UG proposal so as to maintain ambiguity of
fairness until the final word of the proposal (i.e., the amount that
would be taken by the proposer was spoken last), yielding a well-
defined onset time (Figure 1).
As the amygdala is crucial for both the mediation of aggressive
responses [26] and of biasing decision making [2,4], we suggest a
parallel between reactive aggression and the behavior associated
with rejection. Thus, we hypothesized that the amygdala drives
immediate rejection in the UG.
GABA receptors are abundant in the amygdala, and benzodi-
azepines can potentiate GABA activity, reduce behavioral signs of
aggression [26], and decrease amygdala activity in emotional tasks
[27,28]. In the present study, we posited that the benzodiazepine
oxazepam (20 mg orally) could inhibit amygdala activity and, thus,
change behavior in the UG. We assumed that unfair proposals
would generate an amygdala response and increase rejection rate
in the non-medicated group, while oxazepam would inhibit this
process and therefore reduce the rejection rate in response to
unfair proposals, in parallel with a mitigated amygdala response to
unfair proposals. Thus, to test whether the amygdala is involved in
the rejection of unfair offers, we randomly allocated subjects to a
treatment or a placebo group prior to scanning them while playing
the UG.
As will be seen, our design allowed for the detection of the
functional anatomical response to unfair proposals in a subcortical
network that mediates rapid reactive responses. This response was
possible to manipulate selectively with a benzodiazepine both on
the behavioral and the neural response level.
Results
Treatment Decreases Rejection Rate for Unfair Proposals
In line with previous studies, fair proposals were never rejected
in either group [7,29]. The rejection rate (not controlled for
gender) for unfair proposals was significantly lower in the
oxazepam group (19.0%; n=18) than in the placebo group
(37.6%; n=17; p=0.0475; Figure 2A). The same comparison but
controlling for gender in a probit regression showed borderline
significant results (p=0.0675); the predicted rejection rate was
19.5% in the oxazepam group and 36.1% in the placebo group.
However, the gender coefficient was insignificant (p=0.278). The
treatment-induced drop in the rejection rate was 20 percentage
points for men and 15 percentage points for women. Neither the
rejection rate nor the effect of treatment on the rejection rate
Author Summary
It is well-established that emotions influence decision
making. One way of studying this relationship is the
Ultimatum Game, which has revealed that subjects punish
unfair behavior in others in spite of receiving a concom-
itant economic loss. Previous brain imaging studies have
suggested that this decision to punish involves complex
cortical processing. However, punishment also involves an
instant aggressive emotional response, a behavior often
linked to subcortical structures such as the amygdala. In
this study, we present a model that joins these views. We
designed a paradigm that allows us to measure the activity
of subcortical brain regions during decision making in the
Ultimatum Game, while at the same time using a
pharmacological approach that can suppress emotional
responses and amygdala activity. The pharmacological
treatment made subjects punish unfair behavior less, and
decreased brain activity in the amygdala in response to
unfair proposals, without changing the subjects’ feeling of
unfairness. In the control group, punishment was directly
linked to an increase in amygdala activity. Thus, immediate
punishment of unfair behavior involves the amygdala and
is not solely driven by cortical processes, as previously
suggested. Our results show that a commonly used drug
influences autonomy and decision making, which may
have ethical implications for its use.
Amygdala Involvement in the Ultimatum Game
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details).
Main Effect of Fairness Confirms Previous Literature
The functional MRI (fMRI) contrast of unfair versus fair in the
placebo group essentially confirmed the results from Sanfey et al.
[7] (Figure 3A and 3B). The corresponding contrast in the
oxazepam group showed a subsignificant activation in the right
insula (see Figure S1 and Table S1).
Treatment Suppresses Neural Activity Related to
Rejection
Given that oxazepam inhibits rejection of unfair offers,
the interesting contrast is the interaction that probes for
changes in response to unfairness with or without oxazepam
(placebo unfair2fair proposals.oxazepam unfair2fair proposals). We
confirmed our primary hypothesis that the amygdala was relatively
more activated in the placebo group than in the oxazepam group
for unfair offers (left amygdala: Montreal Neurological Institute
Figure 1. Experimental set-up. Thirty-five subjects were randomly assigned to either the control (placebo pill) or the treatment group (oxazepam,
20 mg orally). One hour after treatment subjects played the UG in the MRI scanner by watching 45 movie clips, each with a different human proposer.
The proposals were fair, unfair, or neutral. All proposals had the exact same wording, and the proposer ended the sentence by stating the share that
he/she would get. The fMRI onset time was defined as when the last word was spoken, i.e., when the fairness of the proposal could be judged.
Subjects were instructed to respond either ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to the fair/unfair proposals and ‘‘no’’ to the neutral proposals. After scanning, subjects rated
the fairness of the offers (scale 1–7) [7] and likeability of the proposers’ faces (scale 0–100).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001054.g001
Figure 2. Rejection rate and subjective ratings of fairness and
likeability. (A) Treatment with oxazepam (n=18) reduced the
rejection rate of unfair offers by 49% compared to the control
treatment (n=17) (Mann-Whitney U test, one-tailed, Z=1.722,
p=0.049). Rating of fairness for unfair offers (B) and likeability rating
of the proposers for rejected/accepted proposals (C) did not change
with treatment (fairness, Z=0.658, p=0.51; likeability, Z=0.603,
p=0.55). All the ratings were analyzed with the Mann-Whitney U test,
two-tailed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001054.g002
Figure3.fMRIdatarelatedtounfairproposals.Intheplacebogroup
(n=18), we replicated data from Sanfey et al. [7] in that unfair proposals
elicited activity in (A) right ACC (Montreal Neurological Institute space
coordinates (x, y, z): [9 48 24], Z=3.15, p,0.001, uncorrected) and (B)
bilateral dlPFC (Montreal Neurological Institute space coordinates (x, y, z):
left, [224 36 54], Z=4.04, p,0.001, uncorrected; right, [30 36 51], Z=4.04,
p,0.001, uncorrected). There were more expressed responses in the
placebo group (interaction placebo unfair2fair proposals.oxazepam unfair2fair
proposals) with an increased activation in (C) left mPFC ([26 66 18], Z=3.77,
p,0.05,clusterlevelcorrected)andACC([94824],Z=3.57,p,0.05,cluster
level corrected) and (D) bilateral amygdala (left, [218 26 218], Z=3.25,
p,0.05, corrected; right, [18 0 218], Z=3.03, p,0.05, corrected).
Treatment with oxazepam (n=18) lowered the neural responses related
to unfair proposals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001054.g003
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corrected; right amygdala: [18 0 218], Z=3.03, p,0.05,
corrected; Figure 3D). The amygdala response for the different
conditions is also visualized in Figure 4, where we show that both
groups have similar amygdala activation patterns in response to
the fair condition; however, unfairness up-regulates the amygdala
response in the placebo condition while oxazepam reduces the
amygdala response in the treatment group.
Moreover, the extended fMRI analysis revealed interaction
differences in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) ([26 66 18],
Z=3.77, p,0.05, cluster level corrected) and right ACC ([9 48
24], Z=3.57, p,0.05, cluster level corrected) (Figure 3C). Thus,
subjects who were treated with oxazepam had a diminished
activation in a subset of regions in the neural network normally
activated by unfair proposals [7]. The change in rejection rate
induced by oxazepam did not result in any significant effects in the
dlPFC or the insula, two areas that have previously been linked to
the rejection of unfair offers in the UG [7,29]. Given the previous
data in the literature, we extended the analyses and performed
post hoc specific searches with a single-region-of-interest approach
in the dlPFC and the insula. We noted effects in the interaction
also in these regions (see Text S1). Importantly, the general
cerebral response in the decision making task was unaltered by the
drug (see Text S1 and Figure S2).
Rejection of Unfair Proposals Increases Amygdala Activity
in the Placebo Group
We predicted that increased amygdala activity would corre-
spond to an increased rejection rate also within the placebo group,
as the amygdala is known to have a crucial role in decision making
[2,4] and aggression [26]. To test this hypothesis we did a within-
subject analysis in placebo subjects that both accepted and rejected
unfair proposals (n=6) in both experimental sessions. The contrast
unfair proposals rejected.unfair proposals accepted showed increased
amygdala activity ([21 23 212], Z=3.50, p,0.05, corrected;
Figure 5A).
Males Show a Greater Amygdala Response to Unfair
Proposals
As testosterone can increase aggressive behavior [26], we tested
whether males drive the reactive amygdala response and hence
would show an increased amygdala activity in response to
unfairness. To test this hypothesis, we compared amygdala activity
between sexes for the contrast placebo unfair2fair proposals.oxaze-
pam
unfair2fair proposals. Strikingly, males (n=5) showed a greater right
amygdala activity than females (n=12) in the placebo condition,
while there was no difference between sexes in the oxazepam
condition (males, n=8; females, n=10; Figure 5B). Thus, the
interaction sex6treatment was significant (F[1]=8.50, p=0.007).
However, it is important to emphasize that the effect seen in the
interaction contrast cannot be explained as a gender effect as the
result remains significant (left amygdala: p=0.035; right amygda-
la: p=0.042) even after adjusting for gender (see Text S1).
No Effects of Treatment on Ratings of Unfairness and
Likeability
The subjects treated with oxazepam displayed a decreased
rejection rate to unfair proposals (Figure 2A). In order to probe the
possibility that the change in behavior was due to drug-altered
perception of unfairness or likeability of the proposer, we
compared subjective ratings between groups. Subjects in the
oxazepam group had similar perception of unfairness (Mann-
Whitney U test, two-tailed, p=0.5103; Figure 2B) and perceived
likeability of the proposers (Mann-Whitney U test, two-tailed,
Z=0.63, p=0.5467) as in the control group (Figure 2C). This is in
concordance with the finding that there was no difference in insula
activity between the groups in unfair versus fair offers (see Figure
S1) (the insula is involved in the coding of feeling states [6]). Thus,
we found that the observed change in choice behavior between the
treatment groups was not explained by an altered feeling of
unfairness or insula activity.
Discussion
We are the first, to our knowledge, to show the functional
anatomical response to unfair proposals in a subcortical network
for rapid reactive responses. Our results suggest that the act of
immediate rejection of unfair proposals is driven by a phyloge-
netically old structure (the amygdala) and may be viewed as a
reactive aggressive response. This finding adds additional
information, as previous UG studies have shown involvement of
only a cortical network [7,24]. We propose that the subcortical
and the cortical networks can operate separately and that the
Figure 4. Parameter estimates in the right and left amygdala. Left amygdala: placebo fair, 1.5060.46 (mean 6 standard error of the mean);
placebo unfair, 2.6460.34; oxazepam fair, 2.9160.58; oxazepam unfair, 1.5660.82. Right amygdala: placebo fair, 2.7760.63; placebo unfair,
3.6960.68; oxazepam fair, 3.0260.54; oxazepam unfair, 1.5560.79.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001054.g004
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a richer future representation and operate more slowly [17,19].
Moreover, we demonstrated that the amygdala-driven rejection
response was inhibited with oxazepam treatment without affecting
the perception of unfairness. This suggests that the GABA system
can influence the decision making network via an alteration of the
balance between phylogenetically young (prefrontal cortex) and
old structures (amygdala).
As timing is crucial for detection of transient responses [30], our
design had the necessary elaboration to allow detection of fast
automatic emotional responses to unfairness and not only slow
components. We observed a clear amygdala activation that is in line
withprevious studies (with properonset timing) on emotionalbias in
decision making [2,28]. Our study generates two arguments for a
causal role of the amygdala in the generation of an instant rejection
response. First, in the treatment group, the amygdala response was
mitigated in conjunction with a decreased rejection rate (as
compared with the placebo group). Second, in the within-subjects
comparison in the unmedicated group, rejections were associated
with increased amygdala activity. In light of this, we question the
suggested exclusive causality of the insula in the generation of a
rejection response that was derived from the correlation between
insula activity and acceptance rate of UG offers [7]. Instead, we
propose that the amygdala is involved in instant rejection of unfair
UG offers, whereas the insula might be more involved in a late
rejection response. Importantly, neither result excludes that
separate neural operations can give rise to the same behavior.
Moreover, it is important for future research to segregate which
responses are related to perception of unfairness and which drive
rejection behavior, and how these neural processes interact.
Our data are compatible with the two-level model for decision
making [19]. We have pharmacologically manipulated both levels
in our study. The effects we observed may be based either on
direct pharmacological action or on interaction effects between
regions in the decision making circuit. In another manipulation of
this circuit Knoch et al. [29] showed that transcranial magnetic
stimulation of the dlPFC leads to an increased acceptance rate for
unfair proposals in the UG, without changing the perception of
unfairness. The authors concluded that dlPFC exclusively drives
rejection in response to unfair proposals. We suggest that the
interpretation could be modified, as dlPFC does not seem to play a
role in low-level model-free decision making [19,22]. In support of
this modified interpretation we note that, in a decision making task
where the subject had to remember explicit values supporting the
decision, the dlPFC was shown to be crucial [31]. As the prefrontal
regions mature over the first years of life, the concept of fairness
and theory of mind develop across the same age. The above
interpretation predicts that children will not act as adults. Indeed,
Takagishi et al. [32] demonstrated that preschoolers do reject
unfair offers in spite of having no explicit account of unfairness or
theory of mind. Thus, these findings suggest that dlPFC might be
sufficient but not necessary for rejection, and support a two-level
model for decision making.
Our data provide some additional insights into the role of the
prefrontal regions in decision making. We observed a relative
increase in rostral ACC/ventromedial PFC for unfair versus fair
proposals in the unmedicated versus oxazepam treatment group,
but no changes in the dlPFC. We suggest that this treatment-
related change in rostral ACC/ventromedial PFC is secondary to
reduced amygdala input mirroring a reduction of conflict [33].
However, it is not possible to exclude that the rostral ACC/
vetromedial PFC are part of the attentional control system and
therefore could be directly modulated by the treatment.
We have shown that the basis for decision making in the UG
has underpinnings in several brain regions of different phyloge-
netic origin, and this underlines the complexity of responses in the
UG. Our data suggest that the automaticity driven rejection
response has a phylogenetically older representation than the
calculated acceptance based on a consciously determined self-
optimizing strategy. The amygdala-driven reactive aggressive
response generates a behavior that, for example, yields an
acceptable splitting of a prey within the group, and such an
inequity aversion is seen in children [32]. Thus, automatic
individual reactions to detected unfairness seem, to a certain
extent, to support the long-term group norms that allow sharing.
More developed sharing schemes like formal trade and abstract
Figure 5. fMRI results related to rejection of an unfair proposal and sex difference. (A) The rejection of an unfair proposal was associated
with a higher activity in the right amygdala ([21 23 212], Z=3.50, p,0.05, corrected) in the placebo group (n=6). (B) The difference between sexes
for unfair versus fair proposals in the placebo condition was significant (t[15]=4.30, two-tailed, p=0.001; males, n=5; females, n=12). There was also
a main effect of treatment (F[1]=18.53, p=0.000) and an interaction between gender and treatment for unfair versus fair proposals (F[1]=8.50,
p=0.007). Mean 6 standard error of the mean for parameter estimates in the right amygdala.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001054.g005
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of future effects of present decisions [29,31]. Such social
interactions rest on the development of the human frontal lobe
function. We have demonstrated that an anxiolytic drug alters the
balance between rapid emotional reactions and reflected-feeling-
based decisions. The finding prompts an ethical discussion, as we
showed that a commonly used drug influences core functions in
the human brain that underlie individual autonomy and economic
decision making.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Thirty-five right-handed volunteers with the mean age of
23.764.2 y (13 men, 22 women) were included in the study.
Subjects were randomly assigned to either group independent of
gender (five males and 12 females in the placebo group and eight
males and ten females in the oxazepam group) and had no prior or
present history of psychiatric illness or neurological disease. All
subjects were healthy and took no medications, with the exception
of birth control pills and mild allergy medications. All participants
gave their informed consent. The study was approved by the local
governmental ethics committee in Stockholm, Sweden.
Stimuli/Ultimatum Game
Each subject was exposed to 45 different movie clips. In each
movie there was a different human proposer who made a fair,
unfair, or neutral suggestion (see below) on how to split a sum of
money. The fair proposals implied an equal split of the money; the
proposer said, for example, ‘‘You get 50 Swedish crowns, and I
take 50 Swedish crowns’’ (7 Swedish crowns [SEK]<US$1). The
unfair proposals implied that the responder should receive 20%
and the proposer 80% of the money, for example, ‘‘You get 20
Swedish crowns, and I take 80 Swedish crowns.’’ The total stakes
(e.g., 100 SEK) were deliberately never mentioned, to maintain
ambiguity of fairness until the final proposition of the amount that
would be awarded the responder was revealed. All proposals had
the exact same wording, except for the monetary amounts, since
the total stakes varied. Subjects were instructed to respond with
either ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to the proposals by pressing a button. In the
neutral control condition the subjects were shown films with
proposers saying ‘‘this is not a proposal,’’ and subjects were
instructed to respond ‘‘no’’ to these.
The three different stake levels yielded a total of seven different
kinds of messages. Each subject encountered six 50/50 offers, seven
20/80 offers, five 125/125 offers, five 50/200 offers, four 250/250
offers, three 100/400 offers, and 15 neutral messages. The genders
of the proposers were thoroughly balanced (22 males, 23 females).
Before each movie clip the subject was presented with a resting
frame containing a hair cross, for a duration that was randomized
between 1 and 5 s. Thereafter, a film clip with an offer was
presented. The onset times when the proposer finished the
sentence were included as regressors of interest (individual
regressors for fair, unfair, and no proposals) in the subsequent
general linear model analysis of the fMRI analysis. Each movie
lasted for 7 s. The clip was followed by a pause, which was again
randomized between 1 and 5 s. Thereafter, a frame was shown
saying ‘‘respond now,’’ instructing the subject to make a choice.
This frame lasted until a choice had been made or maximally 3 s.
The onset times when the subject pressed the button for ‘‘yes’’ or
‘‘no’’ were included as a covariate of no interest in the subsequent
general linear model analysis of the fMRI analysis. Finally, a frame
confirmed the decision, with a sign stating ‘‘you got X Swedish
crowns, your counterpart got Y Swedish crowns’’ (2 s).
Proposal Films
A total of 92 individuals were filmed while they read each of the
messages as explained above. All individuals were filmed under the
same conditions, with light from the front, against a white
background, and with the eyes located in the middle of the screen
while speaking into the camera. The films with 45 of these
individuals were kept, and the others were discarded because of
low sound quality or because the person did not look into the
camera as desired.
Monetary Reward
Subjects acting as responders were paid 300 SEK for showing up.
In addition, three of the 45 movies presented to them were selected
at random, and paid out with real money, both for themselves and
for the proposer. If the subject had answered ‘‘yes’’ to such a
selected proposal, both participants were subsequently paid the
corresponding amounts of money. In contrast, if the subject had
declined the proposal then neither of the two received any money
from that film. This information was given to the subjects before the
experiment. The persons acting as proposers on the film clips were
given 100 SEK for making the films. They were also subsequently
paid their part of the proposals that were drawn randomly, as
described for the proposers. Average payment to proposers was 380
SEK, and average payment to responders was 625 SEK.
Experimental Procedures
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to either the
placebo group (five men, 12 women) or the oxazepam group (eight
men, ten women). The subjects in the oxazepam group received
20 mg of the drug. Both treatment and placebo were administered
orally in a single-blind fashion. The subjects had been asked in
advance not to eat for 2 h before the experiment or drink alcohol
for 24 h prior to the experiment. After drug administration, the
subjects were asked to fill out two questionnaires: Swedish
Universities Scales of Personality [34] and State Trait Anxiety
Index–Trait [35]. Before a subject entered the MRI scanner, the
rules of the UG were explained, and the subject’s understanding of
the game was checked with a questionnaire. All subjects passed
this test.
Approximately 1 h after treatment, the first experimental
session was conducted. The order in which the film clips were
presented was randomized in advance, creating 18 different
sequences of clips, or protocols. Each protocol, except for one, was
presented for one subject receiving treatment and for one subject
in the control group. We used an fMRI-compatible glove
answering device in the scanner to register the subjects’ responses.
Subjects responded ‘‘yes’’ by pressing a button with their thumb
and ‘‘no’’ by pressing a button with their index finger. All subjects
underwent two scanning sessions, with a pause of approximately
1 min in between. The first session contained 23 movies, and the
second session contained 22 movies.
After the scanning was completed, subjects were given a
questionnaire and asked to rate the fairness of all the kinds of offers
they had received, on a scale 1–7 [7]. They also viewed pictures of
the proposers and rated the likeability of the faces they had seen,
on a visual analog scale (0–100).
Statistical Analyses
Behavioral data. The effect of the treatment on rejection
rate for unfair proposals was first analyzed with a Mann-Whitney
U test (one-tailed), since we could not assume normally distributed
data. To control for stake size, sex, and ordering of decisions we
analyzed the individual choices with probit regressions (not
Amygdala Involvement in the Ultimatum Game
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nature. Standard errors were clustered on subjects to account for
repeated measures. Since no fair offers were rejected, we restricted
our attention to the unfair responses. Differences in ratings of
fairness and likeability were analyzed with the Mann-Whitney U
test. We used two-tailed tests, as we had no prior assumption about
the direction of a potential treatment effect.
fMRI data. All contrasts of interest were initially analyzed
on a single-subject level, and four contrasts were of interest
for group data analyses. In the second-level analyses we used
masks that were created with the wfu_pickatlas [36,37] tool
in SPM5. To test our main hypothesis we used a bilateral
amygdala region of interest. To validate our data and perform
explorative tests we also used the anatomical boundaries for
the following 13 bilateral regions of interest: ACC, insula,
caudate, putamen, medial orbitofrontal cortex, inferior orbito-
frontal cortex, superior orbitofrontal cortex, rectus, superior
medial frontal cortex, superior frontal cortex, medial frontal
cortex, inferior frontal operculum, and inferior frontal
triangularis. These regions of interest were selected based on
the present literature [7,24,38,39].
To validate the difference between an active versus passive state,
proposals unfair+fair offers were compared to non-proposals control
condition in a one-sample t-test including all subjects. A two-sample
t-test comparing the two treatment groups in the same contrast
was performed as a follow-up analysis. The 14-area mask (i.e., the
13-area mask including amygdala) was used in both analyses.
In our main contrast of interest, placebo unfair2fair proposals.ox-
azepam
unfair2fair proposals, we used only a bilateral amygdala mask in
order to answer our primary hypothesis and increase the sensitivity
for detecting amygdala changes. The same approach was used in
the second main contrast of interest, unfair proposals rejected.un-
fair proposals accepted. In the latter analysis we included all the
subjects (n=6) in the placebo group that both rejected and
accepted unfair proposals in both scanning sessions. In the
extended analyses, 13 of the above stated regions (excluding
amygdala) were used for global search in the two main contrasts of
interest.
To test the main effect of unfairness within groups, we ran the
contrast unfair proposals.fair proposals in the placebo group
versus the oxazepam group. Moreover, to investigate gender
differences, parameter estimates from right amygdala (in the
contrast placebo unfair2fair proposals.oxazepam unfair2fair proposals)
were analyzed with an ANOVA. Specific contrasts between
gender in each treatment group were made with a between-groups
t-test. In the correlation analyses between right amygdala activity
(captured in the placebo unfair2fair proposals.oxazepam unfair2fair
proposals contrast) and rejection rate, we used a non-parametric
approach (Spearman’s rho). In these analyses we correlated the
two variables within all subjects and in each treatment group.
In the psychophysiological interaction analyses we used right
versus left amygdala as a seed region to see which other cortical
regions correlated with the amygdala 6 model variable.
Psychophysiological interaction analysis was performed first on
the individual level (first level) and then on the group level (second
level). In the group analyses we used the same mask as in the
interaction contrast.
Reporting Results
Only corrected results are reported in this article, with the one
exception of the following contrast: placebo unfair proposals.fair
proposals. All results are reported as voxel level corrected, unless
otherwise stated (i.e., cluster level corrected).
Technical Specifications for Image Acquisition and
Analysis
Image acquisition. We used a GE 1.5T MRI scanner to
measure the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response. A
T2* weighted echoplanar image sequence was applied. The
following protocol was used: number of slices, 32; slice thickness,
4.5 mm; interslice gap, 0.5 mm; field of view, 2206220 mm; echo
time, 40 ms; and repetition time, 2.5 s. A total of 168 and 161
image volumes were acquired during the two scanning sessions,
respectively. In addition, we acquired an anatomical T1-weighted
3-D image volume from each subject (3D–spoiled gradient
recalled), echo time/repetition time=35/6 ms, flip=35u, 124
coronal images, matrix size=0.961.060.9 mm
3).
Image pre-processing. The fMRI data were analyzed with
SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/). The following
pre-processing steps were performed: realignment, slice timing
correction, co-registration, and normalization with respect to the
Montreal Neurological Institute compatible echoplanar image
template provided in SPM5. Finally, spatial smoothing was
performed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full width at half
maximum.Event onset timespertaining tothe proposalsand control
conditions were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic
response function as implemented in SPM5, and inserted into a
general linear model. Ten regressors were created for each scanning
session to specify the model—(1) unfairproposal, (2) fair proposal, (3)
noproposal(controlcondition)—and(4)reactiontime.Wecorrected
for residual movement-related variance in the data by including six
motion parameters in the model. High-pass filtering (cutoff
frequency=128 s) was used to remove low-frequency noise. The
statistical parametric map [T] map threshold was determined to
p,0.005, uncorrected in all contrasts.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 fMRI results related to unfair proposals. In
the oxazepam group (n=17) a subsignificant activation was
present in the right insula ([36 21 12], Z=3.34, p,0.001,
uncorrected).
(TIF)
Figure S2 Neural activity related to receiving a proposal.
(A) As a manipulation check we compared proposals unfair+fair offers
.non-proposals control condition within all subjects (n=35). The contrast
showed an activation in the frontal attention network, with a peak
activation in the right mPFC (Montreal Neurological Institute
space coordinates (x, y, z): [6 24 48], Z=6.48; p,0.001, corrected).
(B) The interaction contrast treatment placebo.oxazepam6propo-
sal unfair+fair.control condition showed a subsignificant activation in the
left supplementary motor cortex (BA 6) ([224 215 57], Z=4.18,
p=0.11, corrected).
(TIF)
Table S1 fMRI data. Cerebral foci of activation related to
proposals and unfairness.
(DOC)
Text S1 Supporting results and imaging data.
(DOC)
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